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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, STANDARDS OF REVIEW
AND PRESERVATION BELOW
Issue 1: Did the district court err in holding Mrs. Taylor in contempt of court for
failing to pay $41,000 to Mr. Taylor by January 1, 2010, without entering any findings on
the issue of contempt and despite the fact that she had been attempting to make
arrangements with Mr. Taylor for payment?
Preservation in District Court: This issue was preserved in the district court
during the January 25, 2010, hearing. (R. 02086.)
Standard of Review: The court's failure to enter findings of fact on the issue of
contempt is a legal question, which is reviewed for correctness. Salzetti v. Backman, 638
P.2d 543, 544 (Utah 1981).
"The decision to hold a party in contempt of court rests within the sound discretion
of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court's action "is so
unreasonable as to be classified as capricious and arbitrary, or a clear abuse of
discretion." Marsh v. Marsh, 1999 UT App 14, ^8.
Issue 2: Did the district court err in imposing conditions for purging the contempt
that were entirely unrelated to the issue for which Mrs. Taylor was held in contempt?
Preservation in District Court: This issue was preserved in argument in the district
court at the January Hearing. (R. 02118.)
Standard of Review: This is a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness.

Issue 3: Did the district court err in holding that Mrs. Taylor had not satisfied the
conditions for purging the contempt at the February Hearing?
Preservation in District Court: This issue was preserved at the February 8, 2010
hearing. (R. 02118.)
Standard of Review: The court's failure to enter findings of fact on the issue of
contempt is a legal question, which is reviewed for correctness. Salzetti v. Backman, 638
P.2d 543, 544 (Utah 1981).
"The decision to hold a party in contempt of court rests within the sound discretion
of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court's action "is so
unreasonable as to be classified as capricious and arbitrary, or a clear abuse of
discretion." Marsh v. Marsh, 1999 UT App 14, ^|8.
Issue 4: Did the district court err in holding Mrs. Taylor in contempt for failing to
cooperate in obtaining a passport for her minor child without making sufficient findings
on the issue of contempt and despite Mrs. Taylor's belief that she had complied with the
Court's orders?
Preservation in District Court: This issue was preserved at the February 8, 2010
hearing. (R. 02118.)
Standard of Review: The court's failure to enter findings of fact on the issue of
contempt is a legal question, which is reviewed for correctness. Salzetti v. Backman, 638
P.2d 543, 544 (Utah 1981).
"The decision to hold a party in contempt of court rests within the sound discretion
of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court's action "is so
2

unreasonable as to be classified as capricious and arbitrary, or a clear abuse of
discretion.'* Marsh v. Marsh, 1999 UT App 14, ^8
Issue 5: Did the district court err by imposing unduly harsh and improper
sanctions against Mrs. Taylor for contempt?
Preservation in District Court: This issue was preserved at the February Hearing.
(R. 02118.)
Standard of Review: This issue is a mixed question of law and fact. Although
"sanctions imposed for contempt [are also reviewed] for abuse of discretion," Barton v.
Barton, 2001 UT App 199 ^ 9, the sanctions must comply with the governing contempt
statute in Utah Code Ann. §78B-6-310.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
The interpretation of the following rules and statutes is determinative of this
appeal:
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-301(5):
A party may be held in contempt for "disobedience of any lawful judgment, order
or process of the court."
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-302(2):
When an alleged contempt is not committed in the immediate view and presence
of the court or judge, an affidavit or statement of the facts by a judicial officer
shall be presented to the court or judge of the facts constituting contempt.

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-310:
If the court finds the person is guilty of contempt, the court may impose a fine not
exceeding $1,000, order the person incarcerated in the county jail not exceeding
30 days, or both. However a justice court judge or court commissioner may
punish for contempt by a fine not to exceed $500 or by incarceration for five days
or both.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below

1.

Appellant Trisha Richard Taylor ("Mrs.Taylor") and Paul McKinney

Taylor ("Mr. Taylor") were divorced pursuant to a Decree of Divorce entered in the case
styled Taylor v. Taylor, case no. 054300395 DA., in the Third Judicial District Court for
Tooele County, State of Utah ("Decree").
2.

On January 25, 2010, Judge Stephen L. Henriod held a hearing on various

motions from both parties in the divorce action, including Mr. Taylor's Countermotion
requesting that Mrs. Taylor be held in contempt for failing to pay a debt owed to Mr.
Taylor and for failing to cooperate in obtaining a passport for the minor children. (R.
02075.)
3.

At the January Hearing, the district court held Mrs. Taylor in contempt for

"failing to pay the $41,000 when due" and sentenced Mrs. Taylor to 30 days in jail, plus a
$1,000 fine and an award of fees and costs. (R. 02076.)
4.

However, the court further ordered that Mrs. Taylor could "purge the

contempt" by "getting passports done within five days and paying the $41,000 with 24
hours." (R. at 02076.)
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5.

The Court did not enter any findings of fact or conclusions of law from that

hearing. The Court did not enter an order on the January 25, 2009 hearing until March 4,
2010. (R. 02130.)
6.

On February 5, 2010, Mr. Taylor's counsel filed an affidavit, representing

to the court that Mrs. Taylor had not satisfied the conditions for purging the contempt.
(R. 02096-02094.)
7.

On February 8, 2010, the court held a review hearing ("February Hearing").

(R. 02117.)
8.

Following the hearing, the district court held Mrs. Taylor in contempt and

sentenced her to 30 days in jail plus a $1,000 fine and Mr. Taylor's attorneys' fees and
costs. (R. 02165.)
9.

Mrs. Taylor filed a Petition for Extraordinary Relief, which was denied.

(R. 02139.)
10.

Mrs. Taylor timely filed a Notice of Appeal on March 31, 2010. (R.

02166.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Mrs. Taylor and Mr. Taylor were divorced pursuant to a Decree of Divorce

entered in the case styled Taylor v. Taylor, case no. 054300395 DA., in the Third Judicial
District Court for Tooele County, State of Utah.
2.

On or about May 4, 2009, the special master issued a Special Master Report

and Order ("Report"), which stated that "the parties agree that the children are in need of

passports" and directed them to "cooperate in obtaining a passport" for their younger
child. (R. 01460.)
3.

Shortly thereafter, the parties met at the post office to submit a passport

application, but the child was not with them and Mr. Taylor did not have all the necessary
paperwork. (R. 2045-55.) Mrs. Taylor took a half-day off work and canceled all of her
patients in order to travel from Tooele to Farmington for that meeting. (R. 02086 at 20.)
4.

On May 27, 2009, Mrs. Taylor filed an Objection and Motion to Vacate

Special Master Report and Order. (R. 01497.)
5.

After several attempts to schedule a mutually agreeable time, the parties

made arrangements to meet again to submit the application on July 16. (R. 02044.)
6.

Mrs. Taylor felt that she needed to "clear things up with Mr. Florence," the

special master, regarding the fact that she did not consent to the child having a passport.
(R. 02086 at 20.)
7.

Therefore, on July 13, 2009, Mrs. Taylor communicated to Mr. Taylor and

to the special master her concerns about obtaining a passport for the younger child. (R.
02015.)
8.

On July 14, 2009, Mrs. Taylor sent an email to the special master stating

that, contrary to his Report, she did not consent to obtaining a passport for the child and
that she understood that a parent could not be ordered to give consent to have a passport
issued to a minor child. (R. 02013; R. 02086 at 19; R. 02044-42.)
9.

On July 19, 2009, the special master responded by email, stating that it was

his understanding that the parties had consented to get a passport for the younger child
6

and that he had made his Report accordingly. The special master stated that his Report
would remain unless modified or rescinded by the Court. (R. 2012.)
10.

On July 21, 2009, Mrs. Taylor responded by email, stating that she believed

she had complied with his Report regarding the passport. (R. at 2011.)
11.

On September 3, 2009, the district court entered an order denying Mrs.

Taylor's motion to vacate the Report. (R. 01732.)
12.

On September 8, 2009, Mrs. Taylor sent an email to the special master,

reiterating his comment that he had made the statements about the passport in his Report
because he believed that she consented to it. She asked him "to defer the issue of
overriding a parent consent. . . now that you better understand my objections." She also
stated: "The purpose of this email as well is to present the fact that 1 feel I have
complied with your original request to cooperate and ask you to please acknowledge that
I did." (R. 2008 (emphasis in original); R. 02042.)
13.

The special master responded on September 9, 2009, acknowledging that

the conclusions in his Report regarding the passport were based on his understanding that
she agreed to get a passport for the younger child. He stated: "If you think you have
cooperated in doing what you were to do and Paul thinks you have not, then he can take it
to the Court. If you think that circumstances have changed and that I ought to rescind
that Order then please make it clear that is what you are requesting, but I will tell you that
based on what you have said in your email on this subject, if that is it, then I probably
would not be inclined to change my Order but I will give you another shot at it." (R. at
2007 (emphasis added)).

14.

On November 20, 2009, Mrs. Taylor, acting pro se, filed two motions to

show cause relating to child support and the parties' parenting agreement.
15.

On January 18, 2010, Mr. Taylor filed a Countermotion in response,

requesting that Mrs. Taylor be held in contempt for failing to cooperate in obtaining a
passport for the parties' younger child and for failing to pay the $41,000 owed to Mr.
Taylor. (R. 02205.)
16.

Pursuant to an Amended Order, dated September 3, 2009, Mrs. Taylor had

been ordered to pay $41,000 to Mr. Taylor by January 1, 2010. (R. 01747.)
17.

On January 25, 2010, Judge Stephen L. Henriod held a hearing ("January

Hearing") on the motions from both parties, including Mr. Taylor's Countermotion. (R.
01400.)
18.

Mrs. Taylor represented herself pro se at the January Hearing. Mr. Taylor

was represented by Gayanne K. Schmid. (R. 01400.)
19.

In response to the court's questioning at the January Hearing, Mrs. Taylor

informed the district court that she was in the process of selling her business and intended
to pay the $41,000 to Mr. Taylor from the proceeds of the sale. (R. 02086 at 6.)
20.

She further explained that she had told Mr. Taylor that she was "more than

happy to pay" but that she would "like it to be paid out of the closing or my business
[t]hat is going to be accomplished in January of 2010." (R. 02086 at 6.)
21.

Mrs. Taylor explained that she had contacted Mr. Taylor and "sent him

many emails" to make the necessary arrangements for payment of the $41,000. She
explained to Mr. Taylor that he would need to sign a release requested by the buyer of her
8

business to enable her to close on the sale so that she could pay Mr. Taylor from the
proceeds. (R. 02086 at 5-6; R. 02047.)
22.

Mr. Taylor's counsel stated that she had responded with an email

requesting a copy of the release for her review and consideration, which Mrs. Taylor had
not yet provided when Mr. Taylor filed his motion for contempt on January 15. (R.
02086 at 13-14.)
23.

Mr. Taylor also complained that he had not been provided with a schedule

for the closing but did not allege that he requested one. (R. 02086 at 14.)
24.

Mrs. Taylor informed the court that the closing had been "scheduled and

delayed for going on four weeks" and that it was "scheduled to close around this coming
Friday." (R. 02086 at 6.)
25.

As for the passport, Mrs. Taylor explained that she had previously

appeared for the purpose of signing the documents necessary to obtain a passport for the
younger child. On that occasion, however, Mr. Taylor did not have the proper documents
so she was unable to sign. (R. 02086 at 15.)
26.

At the January Hearing, Mrs. Taylor acknowledged that the special master

had ordered the parties to "cooperate" in getting passports for the children and declared
her belief that "I cooperated as ordered." (R. 02086 at 18-19.)
27.

Mrs. Taylor also explained at the January Hearing that she was concerned

about providing passports for the children to Mr. Taylor because Mr. Taylor was out of
work and she was concerned he would try to flee with the children. (R 02086 at 19.)

28.

Mrs. Taylor further explained to the court that she had understood that the

special master's Report directing the parties to cooperate in obtaining passports for the
minor children was the result of his mistaken belief that she consented to the children
having passports. (R. 02086 at 19.)
29.

Mrs. Taylor further explained her understanding of the email

communications with the special master as follows:
I subsequently contacted Mr. Florence and said, T think
you mistook - when we originally met, I think I was really
trying to get along. I wasn't trying to be oppositional about
anything. You took that as my agreeing to get a passport.' He
wanted in his order the parties agree. I never agreed to get a
passport for the children.
Once I pointed that out, and he said she - a lot of the
email wasn't discussed. He asked if I was agreeing to a
passport, and I said no. I said, T agreed with your original
order. I did cooperate with Paul.' I asked him, 'Now that you
know that I have opposed getting passports for the children,
because we have no relatives outside, because they've had
very negative travel experiences, and because of their young
age of 7 and 9, and a lot of other evidence that shows they
should not be traveling along outside the country with their
dad,' I said, 'Now that you know my stand on that, if you
10

want to make an additional court order that I comply, then
you can do that."
He - once he understood that I was not agreeing to it, he
made no other provisions that I had - no additional court
orders. I did apply - I did (R. 02086 at 19.)
30.

Because the special master did not issue an order forcing her to consent to

obtaining a passport for the minor children, after she had explained to him that she did
not consent, Mrs. Taylor understood that she was no longer required to take steps to
obtain a passport. Id.
31.

Following the hearing, the district court ordered Mrs. Taylor to get a

passport for the younger child within 5 days. (R. at 02076.)
32.

The court also held Mrs. Taylor in contempt for failure to pay $41,000 to

Mr. Taylor by January 1, 2010, sentenced her to 30 days in jail, plus a $1,000 fine and
awarded attorneys fees to Mr. Taylor; however, the court further ordered that Mrs. Taylor
could purge the contempt by paying the $41,000 within 24 hours and getting the
passports done within five (5) days. (R. 02076.)
33.

As sanctions for contempt for failing to pay the $41,000 debt, the court also

ordered Mrs. Taylor to pay Mr. Taylor's attorneys' fees and costs. (R. 02076.)
34.

The court further stated that it was awarding fees and costs because Mrs.

Taylor had repeatedly changed counsel, represented herself, and put Mr. Taylor in a
position where he had to pay legal fees for emails and telephone calls. Id.

35.

The January Hearing concluded at approximately 4:00 p.m. on January 25.

(R. 02075.)
36.

By 2:38 p.m. the next day, Mrs. Taylor's accountant informed Mr. Taylor's

counsel that they would have a check for $41,000 ready that afternoon to be picked up by
Mr. Taylor. (R. at 02095.) Mrs. Taylor's accountants informed Mr. Taylor that he would
need to sign a release in order to receive the check. Id.
37.

Mr. Taylor did not pick up the check, claiming that his counsel did not

receive the communication until 4:30 p.m. Mr. Taylor's counsel did not respond to the
accountant until 5:08 p.m. Id.
38.

In her response, Mr. Taylor's counsel informed the accountant that tender

of the check could not be conditioned upon Mr. Taylor signing a release or even upon
Mr. Taylor picking up the check. (R. 02088-89.) However, the court did not specify in
its order the method of delivery for the payment of the funds to Mr. Taylor. {See R.
02076.)
39.

Mr. Taylor's counsel also informed the accountant in her response as

follows:
My office opens at 9:00 a.m. tomorrow, and Mr. Taylor will
be here. If you will have a messenger be here at that time
with a cashier's check for $41,000, made out to Mr. Taylor,
along with the release, I will advise him to sign it. We have
discussed it and I believe it is likely he will sign it but the
messenger should be instructed to leave the check, whether he
12

signs it or not. Please advise your client that if this does not
occur, I intend to call Judge Henriod, as I was instructed to
do, and have him issue the bench warrant for Ms. Taylor's
arrest.
(R. 02088.)
40.

Mrs. Taylor delivered the check to Ms. Schmid's office by 8:00 a.m. that

morning. (R. 02118 at 3; R. 02095.)
41.

In fact, despite the Ms. Schmid's assurances that she could deliver the

check before 9:00 a.m. on January 27, after learning that Mr. Taylor would not pick up
the check from the accountant on January 26, Mrs. Taylor picked it up herself and
attempted to deliver the check to Mr. Taylor at his home that evening. She waited an
hour-and-a-half for him without success. (R. 02118 at 3.)
42.

Mrs. Taylor then delivered the check to Ms. Schmid's office, per her

instructions, before 8:00 a.m. the next morning, as instructed. (R. 02118 at 3.)
43.

Mr. Taylor's attorney acknowledged that the check was on her desk when

she arrived "early the next morning." (R. 02086.)
44.

As for the passport, Mrs. Taylor signed the passport application for the

younger child within five days of the January Hearing, to obtain the passport as ordered.
(R. 02118 at 3.) Although she included the notation "under duress," with her signature,
she did not believe that this notation would prevent Mr. Taylor from obtaining a passport
for the minor child. (R. 02118 at 3.)

45.

To the contrary, Mrs. Taylor repeatedly notified Mr. Taylor, and the district

court, that a copy of the court order would be sufficient for the minor child to obtain a
passport even without her signature. (R. 02118 at 3.)
46.

Counsel for Mr. Taylor wrongly speculated concerning the passport

application in her affidavit regarding Mrs. Taylor's compliance with the January 25
ruling that "the State Department will undoubtedly reject it." (R. 02094.)
47.

In fact, Mr. Taylor was able to obtain a passport for the minor child based

on the documents presented.
48.

Despite Mrs. Taylor's compliance with the Court's order, on February 5,

2010, Mr. Taylor's counsel filed an affidavit, representing to the court that Mrs. Taylor
had not satisfied the conditions for purging the contempt. (R. 02096-02094.)
49.

The court noticed a hearing for February 8, 2010 ("February Hearing").

50.

Mrs. Taylor appeared pro se at the February Hearing. (R. 02117.)

51.

At the February Hearing, Mrs. Taylor explained to the court that she had

tendered the $41,000 check to Mr. Taylor within the time frame provided but was unable
to arrange delivery with him until the next morning as directed by Mr. Taylor's counsel,
despite her best efforts. (R. 02118 at 3.)
52.

Mrs. Taylor also informed the Court that she had signed the passport

application for the minor child and that it was her understanding that Mr. Taylor would
be able to obtain the passport with or without her signature. Id. at 3-4.
53.

Mr. Taylor's counsel did not contradict this statement at the hearing, but the

court adopted the speculative statement in her affidavit, concluding that Mrs. Taylor
14

"may have signed the application for passport, but you undid that signing by writing
'under duress' next to your signature.'* (R. 02118 at 2.)
54.

Despite the fact that Mrs. Taylor complied with the court's order from the

January Hearing by taking all necessary action to have the passport issued within five
days and by tendering the $41,000 to Mr. Taylor and his counsel within 24 hours, the
court nonetheless found Mrs. Taylor in contempt, sentenced her to 30 days in jail and
imposed a $1,000 fine. (R. 02117.)
55.

Mrs. Taylor is a pediatric dentist and on the day following the February

Hearing, had patients scheduled for 7 a.m. appointments. (R. 02117 at 4.)
56.

After the February Hearing. Mrs. Taylor requested that she be allowed to

call her office to reschedule her patients to another office, but the court refused. Id.
57.

At the February Hearing, the court made no findings but requested that Mr.

Taylor's counsel "pen some kind of history to the prior similar problems." (R. 02117 at
5.)
58.

Mrs. Taylor filed a Petition for Extraordinary Relief with the Utah Court of

Appeals seeking review of the district court's contempt holding, which the Court denied.
(R. at 02139.)
59.

Mrs. Taylor served 30 days in jail, paid a $1,000 fine, and also paid Mr.

Taylor's attorneys' fees.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING MRS. TAYLOR IN
CONTEMPT OF COURT FOR FAILING TO PAY $41,000 TO MR.
TAYLOR BY JANUARY 1, 2010, WITHOUT ENTERING ANY FINDINGS
ON THE ISSUE OF CONTEMPT AND DESPITE THE FACT THAT MRS.
TAYLOR HAD BEEN ATTEMPTING TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS
WITH MR. TAYLOR FOR PAYMENT.
Mrs. Taylor's conduct did not warrant the severe holding of contempt and did not

meet the conditions justifying such a holding under Utah law. The district court therefore
abused it discretion in holding Mrs. Taylor in contempt for failing to pay $41,000 to Mr.
Taylor by January 1.
The Utah Supreme Court has cautioned as follows:
[T]he finding of a person in contempt and sentencing him to
jail is of very serious consequence to the person involved,
somewhat akin to a criminal penalty. It is for this reason that
such a severe measure is not permissible unless a party has
manifested such obstinacy in disobedience of the court order
that it is necessary to accomplish that which equity and
justice demand.
Thomas v. Thomas, 569 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1977) (emphasis added). "Accordingly, in
order to justify a finding of contempt and the imposition of a jail sentence, it must appear
by clear and convincing proof that: (1), the party knew what was required of him; (2),
that he had the ability to comply; and (3), that he willfully and knowingly failed and
refused to do so." Barton v. Barton, 2001 UT App 199, ^18 (emphasis added).
It is well established under Utah law that a court "must enter written findings of
fact and conclusions of law with respect to each of the three substantive elements" to
hold a party in contempt. Salzetti v. Backman, 638 P.2d 543, 544 (Utah 1981). The

16

district court did not make any written findings or order whatsoever, let alone enter
findings specifically addressing each of the substantive elements for contempt. Absent
written findings specifically addressing the three contempt factors, a holding of contempt
is unenforceable. Id.\ Thomas v. Thomas, 569 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah 1977) ("[I]it is our
conclusion that because there are no adequate written findings or judgment, the judgment
that the defendant is in contempt and the sentence of 30 days thereon cannot be sustained;
and they are therefore vacated.") Therefore, regardless of whether all three contempt
elements were or were not met in this case, the court's failure to enter written findings
was "fatal to the enforceability of the contempt order." Salzetti, 638 P.2d at 544. The
holding against Mrs. Taylor must therefore be vacated.
Moreover, the evidence before the court could not support such findings. Mrs.
Taylor repeatedly affirmed to Mr. Taylor and the court that she fully intended to comply
with the court order and make the payment to Mr. Taylor. To that end, she sent
numerous emails to Mr. Taylor, inquiring whether he would be willing to wait for the
payment until she had closed on the sale of her business in later in January. She further
informed the court that the closing and been postponed a number of times but was
scheduled for the end of the month. Mrs. Taylor had also explained to Mr. Taylor that
she would need him to sign a release for the closing to proceed, and his attorney
encouragingly responded by requesting a copy of the release for consideration. Then,
1

Although the district court did enter findings following the February Hearing, these
findings pertained solely to that hearing and not to the January Hearing. Furthermore, as
set forth in detail below, those findings did not address any of the three necessary
elements for contempt nor, based on the facts of record, could those elements have been
met.

without any other response to the request, or even demand for payment, Mr. Taylor filed
a Countermotion on January 15 demanding that Mrs. Taylor be held in contempt for
failing to meet the January 1 deadline.
Nowhere in the record is there any claim by Mr. Taylor that he demanded
immediate payment from Mrs. Taylor or in any way rebuffed her request to make the
payment out of the proceeds of the sale later that month. To the contrary, his attorney
merely responded that she would need to see the release documents first. Although Mr.
Taylor argued at the hearing that Mrs. Taylor had provided no proof that the business was
being sold or when it was closing, there is no evidence in the record that Mr. Taylor ever
requested that information from her. Instead, Mrs. Taylor was led by Mr. Taylor and his
counsel to believe that her request was being considered without objection, right up until
Mr. Taylor moved that she be held in contempt for failing to make the payment.
These facts simply do not support a finding under the first contempt factor—that
by attempting to arrange a later date for payment with Mr. Taylor, Mrs. Taylor knew she
was acting in contempt of a court order. These facts most certainly do not support a
finding that Mrs. Taylor willfully and knowingly failed and refused to obey that order.
To the contrary, the only facts in the record show that Mrs. Taylor intended to pay the
full debt, acted in good faith in requesting that Mr. Taylor agree to a later payment of the
debt, and made repeated, timely efforts to make the necessary arrangements. The facts
also show that Mr. Taylor gave the appearance of being amendable to these requests and
never indicated otherwise until filing a motion for contempt against Mrs. Taylor.
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Because the facts in the record do not satisfy all three requirements for a finding of
contempt, the district court abused its discretion in holding Mrs. Taylor in contempt.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING CONDITIONS FOR
PURGING THE JANUARY CONTEMPT THAT WERE ENTIRELY
UNRELATED TO THE ISSUE FOR WHICH MRS. TAYLOR WAS HELD
IN CONTEMPT.
After holding Mrs. Taylor in contempt at the January Hearing for failing to pay the

$41,000 debt, the district court further provided that Mrs. Taylor could "purge the
contempt" by "getting passports done within five days and paying the $41,000 with 24
hours." Yet, the court had not held Mrs. Taylor in contempt for failing to obtain a
passport for the minor children—but only for failing to pay the $41,000 debt. The court
arbitrarily conditioned the purging of the contempt order on an entirely new, wholly
unrelated issue. In other words, Mrs. Taylor could not simply purge the contempt ruling
related to her failure to pay the $41,000 by paying the $41,000 debt; instead, she was also
required to obtain a passport for the minor children within five days. In fact, it appears
from the transcript of the February Hearing that that was precisely what happened.
Despite having paid the debt owed, the district court nevertheless held Mrs. Taylor in
contempt after wrongfully concluding, based on the speculation of Mr. Taylor's counsel,
that she had made it impossible for Mr. Taylor to obtain a passport for the youngest child.
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MRS. TAYLOR
HAD NOT SATISFIED THE CONDITIONS FOR PURGING THE
CONTEMPT AT THE FEBRUARY HEARING.
Regardless of whether the district court imposed justifiable conditions for Mrs.

Taylor to purge the contempt ruling against her, it erred in concluding that those

conditions were not met. Although it does not appear that Utah courts have directly
addressed this issue, a determination as to whether one has complied with the conditions
for purging a contempt order should be judged by the same standard as that required for
holding a party in contempt in the first instance. Specifically, the district court should
have determined "by clear and convincing proof' that Mrs. Taylor "knew what was
required" of her to purge the contempt, "had the ability to comply" with the conditions,
and "willfully and knowingly failed and refused to do so." See Barton v. Barton, 2001
UT App 199, ^]18 (emphasis added). No such findings were made and no such proof is
found in the record.
As explained above, the district court must enter written findings of fact and
conclusions of law with respect to each of the three substantive elements of contempt
Salzetti v. Backman, 638 P.2d 543, 544 (Utah 1981). The district court did not do so.
Therefore, to the extent that the district court must judge whether one has purged the
contempt according to the same standards for holding one in contempt in the first place,
its failure to do so by making specific written findings renders the resulting contempt
order unenforceable as a matter of law.
Furthermore, the facts in the record do provide clear and convincing proof of
contempt under the three factors. First, the facts in the record demonstrate that Mrs.
Taylor tendered payment of the $41,000 to Mr. Taylor within 24 hours of the January

2

Although the district court did enter findings following the February Hearing, these
findings pertained solely to that hearing and not to the January Hearing. Furthermore, as
set forth in detail below, those findings did not address any of the three necessary
elements nor, based on the facts of record, could those elements have been met.
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Hearing, as ordered by the court. The January Hearing concluded at approximately 4:00
p.m. By 2:38 p.m. the very next day, Mrs. Taylor's accountant informed Mr. Taylor's
counsel that they would have a check for $41,000 ready that afternoon to be picked up by
Mr. Taylor. Mr. Taylor did not pick up the check, claiming that his counsel did not
receive the communication until 4:30 p.m. She did not respond to the accountant until
5:08 p.m., after the 24-hour time period had lapsed.
In response, Mr. Taylor's counsel informed the accountant that she would be in
the office the next morning at 9:00 a.m. and that the check could be delivered to her
office at that time.3 Despite these assurances of Mr. Taylor's counsel, after learning that
Mr. Taylor would not pick up the check from the accountant that afternoon, Mrs. Taylor
picked it up herself and attempted to deliver the check to Mr. Taylor at his home that
evening. She waited for Mr. Taylor for an hour-and-a-half, without success. Mrs. Taylor
then delivered the check to Mr. Taylor's attorney before 8:00 a.m. the next morning, prior
to the deadline set by Mr. Taylor's counsel. Mr. Taylor's attorney acknowledged that the
check was on her desk when she arrived "early the next morning."
These facts simply do not justify a finding that Mrs. Taylor willfully and
knowingly failed to meet this condition set by the court to purge the contempt. If

3

In her response, Mr. Taylor's counsel objected to the fact that Mr. Taylor would be
required to sign a release and that he had to pick up the check himself. Although she
attempts to make much of this issue, the fact remains that Mrs. Taylor did not run afoul
of any court order with these arrangements. The court made no provision whatsoever in
its order for how and where the check was to be delivered, yet Mr. Taylor's counsel
purported to dictate all of that to Mrs. Taylor and then condemned her to jail for failing to
meet those unilateral, self-imposed conditions. Furthermore, Mr. Taylor's counsel stated
in her response that she would recommend to Mr. Taylor that he sign the release.

anything, the facts demonstrate that Mrs. Taylor made every reasonable effort to meet
those conditions and acted to the best of her ability to comply. Furthermore, Mrs. Taylor
was led to believe by Mr. Taylor's counsel that she could deliver the check before 9:00
a.m. the next morning without objection, a fact strongly reaffirmed by the affidavit of Mr.
Taylor's counsel, Gayanne Schmid. In fact, in that affidavit, Ms. Schmid acknowledged
that it would have been "unreasonable" for her not to do so. Yet, Ms. Schmid then
insisted that Mrs. Taylor be held in contempt despite the fact that she personally
delivered the check to Ms. Schmid's office by 8:00 a.m., as instructed by Ms. Schmid.
Although Ms. Schmid made much of the fact that Mrs. Taylor initially insisted on a
release for the check, Ms. Schmid stated in her affidavit that she had advised her client to
sign the release once the check was delivered to her office. Furthermore, Mrs. Taylor
delivered the check to Ms. Schmid's office without any release at all. The facts in the
record demonstrate that, to the extent that Mrs. Taylor was held in contempt at the
February Hearing for failure to comply with the condition of "paying the $41,000 with 24
hours," it was an abuse of the court's discretion.
Second, the facts in the record demonstrate that Mrs. Taylor complied with the
court's order by "getting passports done within five days." Mrs. Taylor had already
obtained a passport for the older child, so the only remaining requirement was that she
get a passport for the younger one. The record shows that within five days of the hearing,
Mrs. Taylor signed the passport application for the minor child, which resulted in the
issuance of the passport. Although she admittedly included the notation "signed under
duress," by her signature, the record plainly established that she did not believe this
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notation would prevent Mr. Taylor from obtaining a passport for the minor child and it
did not. To the contrary, Mrs. Taylor correctly and repeatedly notified Mr. Taylor that a
copy of the court order would be sufficient for the minor child to obtain a passport with
or without her signature or even her consent. In fact, Mr. Taylor was able to obtain a
passport for the minor child based on the documents presented.
Nevertheless, the district court held Mrs. Taylor in contempt for failing to comply
with its order regarding the passport. It did so apparently based solely on the false and
groundless speculation by Mr. Taylor's counsel that the "under duress" notation would
force the State Department to reject the passport application. This prediction of a future
event, unsupported by any admissible evidence, is not a sufficient basis for holding Mrs.
Taylor in contempt. It wrongly led the court to believe that Mrs. Taylor "undid" her
consent by including that notation, when in fact she correctly believed that the notation
would have no effect whatsoever on Mr. Taylor's ability to obtain a passport for the
younger child. The court abused its discretion in holding otherwise.
Finally, even if the determination of whether Mrs. Taylor satisfied the conditions
for purging the contempt was judged by some other, more exacting standard, the facts in
the record demonstrate that Mrs. Taylor satisfied the conditions for purging the contempt.
She tendered the $41,000 payment within the time allotted and made every effort to
effect delivery in a timely manner. She had no ability to force Mr. Taylor to accept the
payment. She correctly believed that she had done what was necessary to enable Mr.
Taylor to obtain a passport for their younger child, and he was in fact able to do so. Mrs.
Taylor fully satisfied the conditions or, at worst, did everything within her power to

comply with the conditions and certainly did nothing evidencing a willful and knowing
failure or refusal to comply. The court, therefore, abused whatever discretion it may have
had in holding Mrs. Taylor in contempt.
IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING MRS. TAYLOR IN
CONTEMPT FOR FAILING TO COMPLY WITH ITS ORDER TO
OBTAIN A PASSPORT FOR HER MINOR CHILD.
The findings in the record do not support a holding of contempt. The sole finding

in the record on the issue of the passport provides as follows:
Respondent met Petitioner to get the child's passport
accomplished but admittedly wrote "signed under duress"
under her signature on the passport application. By way of
explanation, Respondent stated that under federal law only
one parent needs to give consent for a passport if that parent
attaches a document stating that there is a court order in
place.
(R. 02132.) This single finding is wholly insufficient to support a finding of contempt
under Utah law.
First, as noted above, a court "must enter written findings of fact and conclusions
of law with respect to each of the three substantive elements" in holding a party in
contempt. Salzetti v. Backman, 638 P.2d 543, 544 (Utah 1981). The district court did not
do so. The court did not even mention the three factors, let alone analyze them based on
the facts in the record and make specific written findings for each element. Its failure to
do is "fatal to the enforceability of the contempt order." Salzetti, 638 P.2d at 544; see
also Thomas v. Thomas, 569 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah 1977) ("[I]it is our conclusion that
because there are no adequate written findings or judgment, the judgment that the
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defendant is in contempt and the sentence of 30 days thereon cannot be sustained; and
they are therefore vacated.") The court's contempt holding must likewise be vacated.
Furthermore, this single finding does not constitute "clear and convincing proof
that Mrs. Taylor knew what was required of her, had the ability to comply, and willfully
and knowingly failed and refused to do so. See id. To the contrary, it demonstrates that
Mrs. Taylor met with Mr. Taylor and signed the passport application, believing correctly
and in good faith that this would be sufficient for Mr. Taylor to obtain the passport.
The fact that Mrs. Taylor included the notation "signed under duress" with her
signature is of no import whatsoever. The court's order was to get the passport, not to
sign the application, and the record clearly shows that the notation had no impact at all on
Mr. Taylor's ability to obtain a passport for the younger child. Mrs. Taylor never
believed that it would. At all relevant times, Mrs. Taylor correctly believed - and
correctly informed both Mr. Taylor and the court - that Mr. Taylor simply needed to
submit a copy of the court's ruling in order to obtain a passport for the younger child.
Nothing in any court order required Mrs. Taylor to sign the passport application at
all. Nothing in the any court order prohibited Mrs. Taylor from reaffirming the fact that
she did not approve of her young child having a passport in the event that she did agree to
sign a passport application. Mrs. Taylor was not required to cheerfully and happily
obtain a passport for the child. She was simply required to do what was necessary to get
one and she did so within the timeframe allotted.
Therefore, the findings of fact do not provide "clear and convincing proof that
Mrs. Taylor failed to comply with any court order at all, much less that she "willfully and

knowingly" did so. The district court therefore abused its discretion in holding Mrs.
Taylor in contempt for failing to comply with its orders to obtain a passport for the
younger child.
V.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING UNDULY HARSH AND
IMPROPER SANCTIONS AGAINST MRS. TAYLOR FOR CONTEMPT.
The district court exceeded its statutory authority by sanctioning Mrs. Taylor for

contempt beyond that allowed under Utah law. Section 78B-6-310 of the Utah Code
provides as follows:
If the court finds the person is guilty of the contempt, the court may
impose a fine not exceeding $1,000, order the person incarcerated in
the county jail not exceeding 30 days, or both.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-310 (2008) (emphasis added). Despite the clear limitation on
sanctions in the statute, at the January Hearing, the district court imposed a $1,000 fine, a
30-day jail sentence, and an award of fees and costs for the alleged contempt. The award
of Mr. Taylor's fees and costs is nowhere comprehended in or authorized by the
governing statute. Because the award of fees and costs exceeded the maximum sanctions
allowed by statute for contempt, the district court erred as a matter of allow in awarding
those fees.
Furthermore, Mrs. Taylor's conduct did warrant such harsh and serious sanctions,
as set forth in detail above. Also, Mrs. Taylor was appearing pro se at all relevant times
in these proceedings. The Utah Supreme Court has cautioned lower courts that laypeople
representing themselves "should be accorded every consideration that may reasonably be
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indulged" because of their "lack of technical knowledge of law and procedure." Lundahl
v. Quinn, 2003 UT 11 (Utah 2003).
Accordingly, this court generally is lenient with pro se litigants. Individuals
have a right to represent themselves without being compelled to seek
professional assistance. Where they are largely strangers to the legal
system, courts are understandably loath to sanction them for a procedural
misstep here or there.
Id. (emphasis added).
The facts of record do not show any indulgence or leniency accorded to Mrs.
Taylor at all. To the contrary, the court cited the fact that Mrs. Taylor had chosen to
represent herself as evidence that she was attempting to be difficult and, therefore, as an
additional justification for imposing sanctions against her. (R. 02086 at 26.) The court
further cited the fact that her emails and telephone calls to Mr. Taylor's counsel forced
him to incur attorneys' fees as warranting sanctions, despite the fact that such emails and
calls were necessitated by her self-representation.
The district court did little to hide its hostility and antagonism towards Mrs.
Taylor, as is plainly evident from the hearing transcripts. This hostility appears to have
colored the court's judgment and prejudiced the court against Mrs. Taylor, despite her
pro se status.
Mrs. Taylor was sent to jail immediately following the February Hearing. The
court refused to allow her to call her dental office to make arrangements to reschedule all
of the patients that were coming the next morning or even to make arrangements for child
care. The court insisted that Mrs. Taylor remain incarcerated the full 30 days. During
that time, Mrs. Taylor was unable to earn a living to support her family.

Furthermore, although it appears from the record that the court intended to award
attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with Mr. Taylor's Countermotion for
contempt, his attorney submitted an affidavit of fees and costs incurred in connection
with additional motions, including responses to Mrs. Taylor's Motions for Relief from
Amended Judgment and Motion to Show Cause re: Child Support and Request for
Restraining Order. (R. 02162.) The court clearly stated that the award of fees and costs
were sanctions for contempt and made no findings whatsoever that Mrs. Taylor's pro se
motions were filed in bad faith or lacked merit. Consequently, an award of fees and costs
incurred for the additional motions filed by Mrs. Taylor was unwarranted and incorrect as
a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
The district court improperly held Mrs. Taylor in contempt. The court erred as a
matter of law by failing to make or enter any findings as to the three elements of
contempt. In fact, the facts in the record were insufficient to demonstrate that Mrs.
Taylor knowingly and willfully disobeyed a court order.
The district court also erred in conditioning the purging of contempt on actions
wholly unrelated to the matter for which Mrs. Taylor was held in contempt at the January
Hearing.
The district court also erred in sanctioning Mrs. Taylor for contempt beyond that
authorized by Utah law. The court improperly awarded attorneys' fees for contempt, in
addition to a 30-day jail sentence and a $1000 fine.

28

Because the district court's actions were incorrect as a matter of law and constitute
an abuse of its discretion, the contempt orders and sanctions must be vacated.
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ADDENDUM

-1IN TflE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PAUL MCKINNEY TAYLOR,
Pelitionei,
Case No. 054300395 DA

vs .
TRISIIA RICHARD TAYLOR,
Respondent.

Hearing
Electronically Recorded on
January 2b, 2010

BEFORE: THE HONORABLE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD
Third District Court Judge

APPEARANCES
I'ot the Petitioner:

Gayanne K. Schmid
SCIIMID & LUI1N
331 S. Rio Grande JJ201
SLC, UT 8 4 101
Telephone: ( 8 01)5 31 - 8 300

For the Respondent:

Trisha Richard Taylor
(Appearing pro se)

Transcribed by: Natalie Lake, CCT

2/3 Interlochen Ln.
Stansbury Park, UT 84074
Telephone: (435) 590-5575

1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on January 25, 2010)
TJIE COURT:

3

Okay.

Taylor

vs. Taylor.

I have mulriple

4

motions from Ms. Taylor, and one or two from Mr. Taylor.

5

to 1 I you frankly, people, I'm not making nearly enough money foi

6

doing the kind of babysitting I've had to do on this caso.

7

time for you folks to grow up, take responsibility for youi lives

8

and your children and move forward.

9

MS. TAYLOR:

10

THE COURT:

11

MS. TAYLOR:

I'll

It's

Your donor -That said, go ahead, Ms. Taylor.
I agree with you, your Honor.

I'm going to

12

be very succinct.

13

motion to show cause with respect to child support, it has been

14

turned O V P I

15

give us a process for disengaging and allowing them to make

16

the -- to handle that part of it.

17

It wasn't rny wish to be in court today.

On my

to the Office of Recovery Services, and that should

What is showing is that he is current with -- except

18

there is a balance of $58, and it shows a check for $58.

19

going to be, I believe, the evidence I give you today.

20

not considered is his past arrearage of $406 for May, June and

21

July.

22

That's

What was

In Exhibit B the very first -- about halfway down the

23

page Ms. Schmid sends an email to me that says, "On November 16th

24

with regard to the motion pending for child support, which should

25

now be taken care of now that Paul knows what he needs to pay,
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which is $406 for May, June and July "

2

balance of $1718 for that

3

1IIL COURI

4

MS

TAYLOR

So T show an outstanding

Okay
I did receive -- with respect

to the

5

petitioner's motion for attorney's fe«->s, I sent several emails

6

to hi, Counsol requesting that we resolve this out of court

7

On January

8

eithr r over the phone or by email

9

if wc did not have to take this to court

/Lh I said, 'I'd really like to discuss this with you
I think it would be bcttei
I'm looking forward

10

to hearing from you

11

ORS, -- and I had elected to go that route, there is nothing

12

further to discuss

1 i

She responded that because the case was

I wrote her back and I said, "In general I think any out

14

of court procedure to get things resolved is preferable

I don't

lb

see ORS precluding your involvement "

16

get involved with this, so I had -- I tried to settle this out of

17

court

]8

heard

Counsel did not want to

So I think her grounds for attorney's fees should not be

19

THE COURT

20

MS

TAYLOR

Okay

That's all you have?

Just here is -- that's -just the statement

21

from the ORS showing that he does have a balance of zero, but

22

the $106 that was due for May, June and July was not taken into

23

consideration

24

said it was ]ust an oversight

25

orders, and they were going to include that.

When I discussed that with the ORS last week they
They reprocessed the temporary

1

rilC COURT

2

MS

Okay

IAYLOR

I'm not asking for the Court to do anything

3

today

1 think it's going to be all taken care of by the Office

4

o f Recovery Services

5

lb' to T P P if she would want me to withdraw the motion and to

6

)pp if she had processed any counter motions or any filings

7

had written mp an email the previous week saying she needed an

8

address, and I hadn't received anything from her, so I )U)t at

9

that point didn't know if she was trying to serve rno with papers

I did try to contact Ms

Senmid on

January

She

10

and I wao just contactmq her office to let her know that I had

11

not received any papers
1 he reason 1 believe she did not want me to cancel

12

this

13

motion going forward is ->he had plans to bring a counter motion

14

I filed an objection to her counter motion under Rul«^ 101 (b) --

15

or excuse me, (g)

16

response to my motion

17

It appears that a counter motion should be in

My motion was an order to show cause with respect

to

18

chald support

I think her -- as I said in my affidavit, her

19

real intent for bring the counter motion was to kind of muddy

20

up this water and muddy up the waters, and she even says in her

21

affidavit that she accuses me ot coming to the Court with unclean

22 I h a n d s
23

So I'm going to ask the Court in my objection to her

24

counter motion that it should not be considered, that these -- l £

25

these really are issues, she should bring them as a motion, and I
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should have a proper amount of tame to respond.

2

Till: COURT:

3

MS. TAYLOR:

Okay.
With respect to the restrajning ordei, with

4

the settlement that I entered into on April 15th, my goal was to

5

disengage with the petitioner at all costs.

6

with him.

7

s^e that we go back and forth about something so simple as $3b?

8

a month in child support.

It -jusr goes on and on and on, and 1

9

don't think the petitioner

really wants to disengage.

I just feel like with the amount of emails, you can

10

I filed a --

11

Tim COURT:

12

MS. TAYLOR:

13
14
15
16
17

I want to disengage

emails about

You still owe him $11,000?
Yes, sir, I do, and I have sent him several

that and to his Counsel.

THE COURT:

I'm in the --

It's kind of hard to disengage when you have

something that big hanging out there.
MS. TAYLOR:

1 agree.

May 1 explain the circumstances*

'surrounding that?

18

THE COURT:

19

MS. TAYLOR:

If you want.
I'm in the process of selling my business.

20

The loan officer for the seller -- or excuse me, tor the buyer

21

has requested that I get Paul to sign a release of all claims.

22

had asked Ms. Schmid to review a release of all claims against my

23

business, so that $41,000 will be paid out of the proceeds of the

24

sale of rny business, which should be accomplished, and I told him

25

in January .

I

1

At the same time I just -- I found it very odd that come

2

January 1 , even though the petitioner did not want to clear up

3

our previous financial dealings of 2009, he was ready at 2010 to

4

put his hand out and ask for the $41,000.

5

As 1 said to both of them, I'm more than happy to pay

6

that.

/

That is going to be accomplished in January of 2010.

8
9

I'd

like it to be paid out of the closing of my business.

THE COURT:
you to pay it?

How long has that been?

10

MS. TAYLOR:

11

THE COURT:

12

2010?

13

Okay.

When was the decree or order that ordered

It ordered me to pay it January 1:'' of 2010.
That's what the order was, January lr'' of

Then you're 25 days late.

MS. TAYLOR:

No.

That's not right.

I just -- I had sent them emails

14

saying yes, it will be paid.

15

could we please clear up 2009 financial dealings, and then move

16

on

17

wasn't going to pay it, that it wasn't due.

18

many emails about paying that, and that -- requested that it be

19

paid out of closing of my business.

to 2010.

Could we please -- and I asked them

I don't feel like in any way I have told them 1

20

THE COURT:

21

MS. TAYLOR:

I've sent them many,

Is there a closing scheduled?
It's been scheduled and delayed for going

22

on four weeks, so it is scheduled to close around this coming

23

Friday.

24

THE COURT:

25

MS. SCHMID:

Let rne hear from Ms. Schrnid.
Your Honor, since November 2009, two-and-a-

1

h-i 1 f- m o n t h s , Ms

2

lour m o t i o n s

One of them

3

rh'j good

>fn ) e

not to notice

4

has boon

mediated,

5

to handle

6

from n o t i c i n g

7

these

Jaylor

first

issues

ohf w i t h d r e w

her motion

9

had one read

the ones,

riMlKod

11

interests

12

petitioner,

13

thdt

to have the Court

for relief,

at the last minute because

14

filod

it back

in November

lb

w a , unnecessary

16

SOLVITes,

She turned

60(b) motion,
she had

time

support

was wrong

it over

that

with

is she was dead

for child

What

is supposed

she did it in the bpst

of her family, and to minimi 7e court

this motion

it

she has filed,

sort of a Rule

but the fact of the matter

>ince

restrain her

can't request

She said

filed

She h a , had

master

to the four motions

ohe was wrong

She filed

37

issues

the special

that up, but I p r o b a b l y
as

She's

it up yet for a hearing,

I'd love

8

for herself

is on visitation

and of course,

In the meantime

10

appeared

about

wrong

-- she actually
this

to the Office

l :> that it

of Recovery

and he's current
Thiid,

she's

filed an e m e r g e n c y

restraining

19

timely

20

just doesn't e^ist,

23

want to have to come back here again because this is getting out

22

of hand

24
25

I don't

It was not a proper

Ilir COURT

even

reply

know what

for a

18

23

o r d e r , which

request

SCIIMID

It wasn't

to my counter m o t i o n ,

and it

but I'm going to address it because 1 don't

Is that the one about email and

service rind all the rest of that*3
MS

it is

That's what

it's about.

p^isonal
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THI-: COURT:

Okay.

2

MS. SCI1MID:

I've read it.

And then we filed oui counter motion, your

3

Honor, alloqinq her lack of compliance.

Your Honor, Ms. Taylor

4

rr-fuses to comply with the terms of the decree of divorce.

5

refuses to comply with the special master's orders.

She

6

She represents herself, but doesn't read or comply with

/

court rules or statutes, and then says, "Oh, I'm not an attorney

8

so I don' t know how to do this."

9

She insists on calling my office, and then takes whatever 1 said

She plays games with service.

10

or my staff says, turns it around, convolutes it, misrepresents

11

it, and then when I call her on it, threatens to send me to the

12

stale bar.

13

When I won't take her calls she barrages rne with live to

14

six emails per day that if I don't respond to, I get another set

15

of emails threatening to take me to the bar for being

16

unresponsive.

17

This has just got to stop.

She files whatever she wants whenever she wants, and

18

she doesn't care about corresponding with the law.

19

nothing.

20

of her baseless untimely motions, like I expect you will, my

21

client's still out.

22

He's had to pay me to come and argue this, and to answer her five

23

and six emails, and to tell her I won't take her phone calls.

24
25

It costs her

Even if you today, your Honor, deny each and every one

He's had to pay me to oppose all of this.

The only deterrent is
$10,000 per month.

fees and costs, although she makes

So maybe even jail time is the only way to do
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it, because if you'll recall, your Honor, you almost had to throw

2

hor in jai1 just to get her to sign Val Hale's standard contract

3

forms, and that is what I've been going through, the same thing

4

all over again.

5

So now let me get to the motions.

6

motion should be denied.

7

balance is zero.

8

going to collect it.

9

Her child support

As she just handed you, your Honor, the

If there was a mistake on ORS's part, they're
So LL'S totally unnecessary.

Secondly, you have to know what you've got to do and

10

wilfully not do it.

11

She hasn't proved that.

12

knew what; he was supposed to do, didn't do it wilfully or

13

wrongfully, so obviously she hasn't even recited that lie's in

.14

contempt of court.

15

You know, this is the contempt

standard.

She hasn't even alleged that my client

But we want fees, your Honor.

I mean what happened here

16

is if your Honor will recall, there was there arrangement where

17

they were all going to pay money into a child support fund.

18
19

THE COURT:

Oh, yeah, a terrible arrangement and I

wouldn't allow it.

20

MS. SCHMID:

Okay.

In June you through this out.

21

Okay.

But then we had to figure out what the child support

22

amount should be, so then we had to exchange income information.

23

Then we tried to get that revisited.

24

November that; we finally got the final ruling from the Court

25

where you said 352.

Anyway, it wasn't until
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That day we sent her an email and said, "Okay, we owe

2

you" -- and she quoted it to you today.

3

jr i <j tor

4

but wc get to take out the insurance premiums.

5

the ins uia nee premiums, it reduces it to 1,125.

6

send you a check foi 125 this week.

7

the check.

8

me," and she turned it over the Office of Recovery Services.

9

May, June, July.

He owes 406, or whatever

He owes 352 for all of these months,
So if we take out
Paul is going to

Her response?

"Don't send

Stop payment on the checks you've already sent to

So then she wants to negotiate with me, and I say,

10

"Iley, you turned it over to the Office of Recovery Services.

11

Once it goes to them, he's got to make payments directly to thcrn.

12

They're going to make a decision what's in arrears, and I can't

13

deal with you anymore on this."

14

bad faith.

15

negotiating with me about the child support.

16

shouldn't have to pay attorney's fees because I tried to

17

negotiate this."

18

accuses rue of bad faith.

19

your Honor.

20

Her response?

"Oh, you're in

I'm going to turn you over to the state bar for not

No, she didn't.

Moreover, we

She cuts us off and then

This is what we go through every day,

It's driving me crazy.

So we want attorney's fees associated with responding

21

to that motion.

And then -- oh, and by the way, your Honor, it

22

gets turned over to ORS.

23

information, all of that.

24

deducted, even though it's bold as

25

that he's allowed to deduct the insurance premiums.

My guy provides all of his premium
She insists premiums can't be
brass in the amended

judgment

She wouldn't
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t.v«Mi ttll ORS about it, and then when they asked her about

?

„ j ^ ( "Oh, but

3

relief from that part of the judgment "

4

just withdrew

5

1 don't agree with that

it she

J filed a motion to S(u^
That was the one she

Well, so that's what this was all about

So even then

6

when ORS said to her, "Look, premiums get withdrawn from the

7

(hild support," she still noticed this up for a hearing

8

why wo want attorney's fees

9

That's

It's not right

Ne^t, this motion for relief, like I said, it's sort

10

of a Rule 60(b) motion, only she really didn't read the statute

11

She didn't state any grounds

12

filed within 90 days after the Court

13

on c»nptember 3"'

14

heard today, a month late lor her is okay

15

It was untimely because it was not
signed the amended

judgment

It was a whole month late, but as you'vi

just

She doesn't have to pay her 41,000, she doesn't have to

16

file a Rule 60(b) motion on time

17

because her attorney got all of the papers, got the amended

18

judgment, had his time to file an objection, didn't file an

19

objection.

20

yet she wanted to challenge the insurance premiums because she

21

disagreed.

22

This Court signed it.

She had no grounds to file it

It was all above board, and

What statute, what rule allows her to file a motion

23

that I'v^ got to respond to and pay a lot of money -

and my

24

client's got to pay a lot of money for me to respond to because

25

shp disagrees, that's no grounds to -- for relief from amended
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j udgrnen t .

2

Next, we've got this emergency motion.

3

denied, your Honor

4

of my counter motion, so it wasn't a reply

5

even an emergency.

6

judgment, such as curbside pickup and delivery

7

enforced.

8

moreover it's not an emergency

9

residences, it's in the amended judgment.

10

It's not timely.

We want that one

It went beyond th^ scope
Moreover, it's not

Much of the relief if already in the amended
She wants jr

There's no allegations it's not being enforced, and
Not going to one another's

She wants to call my office in an emergency

Your

11

Honor, our counter motion -- I'm asking that she be restrained

12

from ever calling my office.

13

I do not want to get in trouble with the state bar because T

14

don't

I don't want to talk with her

have a record of every single word I've said to her

15

She wants us not to deliver documents to her house

16

because the kids might get it.

17

physical address.

18

1 ask her for a physical address.

19

one I can give you."

20

faxes.

21

Well, she won't give us a

These are the games she plays on service.
"Well, I really don't have

Well, then accept fax service.

"Oh, no, no

I won't accept any faxes."
So what it means is I've got to play this little service

22

qame of where do I leave the papers.

We left them on her porch

23

after ringing the doorbell because she wouldn't give mo an

24

address.

25

counter motion that she accept that -- that she give us a fax

I'm asking you today, your Honor, as part of our

-13nurubor and

accept

where d o c u m e n t s
in Salt
1 have

fax s e r v i c e , and she give

can be

Lake City.
no physical

left.

I've

u n w o r k a b l e , but she plays

telling

untruths

She wants
again,

and

of w h a t ' s
I wish

said

1 could

say

it was not
so we'll

She won't

she want?

read

the rules.

to.

out here.

It

is just

restraining

your H o n o r ,
Well,

There's

I was exaggerating

I'm

agree.

She wants

me and my client.

Honor

documents

them

address

in court
youi

what

today.

Honor,

a qualified

about

from

once

privilege

your

Honor.

this woman

has

I am n o t .

They're

bad,

games.

your

in c o u r t , and we don't do it anyway,

been d o i n g , but

since

to hand deliver

exaggerations,

to restrain

she doesn't

It's u n w o r k a b l e ,

got to hand deliver

address

What else does

us a physical

not

emergencies.

timely

respond

This is not

filed, but I don't

to

it orally,

a proper

want

and a g a i n ,

motion

to have to come
it should

be

denied .
So going
restrained
We want
and

from calling

her

counter motion, your
my o f f i c e .

to give a fax

a physical

already

to our

talked

number.

address.

Now

about

41,000.

the

I've
I've

Honor, we want

already
already

let's talk about

told
told

you why.
you why,

this --- okay.

She's a d m i t t e d

her

she hasn't

We
paid

it .
She says
release.

that

she asked me -- asked

I sent her back

the r e l e a s e .

I think

an email

the amended

right away
judgment

my client
saying,

to sign a
"Show me

is sufficient

to waive
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his cldjms, but if you need a release signed or your company asks

2

for it, let me see it, I'll take a look at it."

3

ro agree carte blanche to have my client sign a release without

4

looking «J I it.

5

I'm not going

She hasn't sent me a single thing.

She hasn't sent me a schedule for closing.

She's not

6

sent me one document showing that this business is even for sole,

/

has sold, will sell.

8

saying, "Oh, don't worry about it.

9

release."

10

emended

I have no proof at all except her word
It will sell.

It's not enough, your Honor.

Just sign the

She's in contempt of the

judgment.

11

Now let's go to Brian Florence.

12

straight on Brian Florence, your Honor.

13

situation.

We need to get her
This is another V.j 1 l!al<*

Here's what she did with the passports.

14

MS. TAYLOR:

Could I --

15

MS. SCHMID:

Your Honor, here's what she did with the

16

passports.

Brian Florence met with them.

He's supposed to be

17

the best special master on these issues between them on the

18

children.

19

first of all, she said Nathan's already got one.

20

refuses to provide proof of it.

They agreed to get the children a passport.

Well,

Well, she

21

One of the things we're asking for today, your Honor, is

22

she give us a video of -- a xerox copy of Nathan's passport which

23

sh** srjys she has.

24

because ihc otherwise won't do it.

25

We need to have her do it by a date certain,

Now with respect to the passports, they decided to get
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passports

2

cooperate

3

Jt

4

show up, but

5

she showed

,IIUP

Brjan

in getting
April

6

8

aqjrc

9

unemployed,

them

can't

make rne

13

exactly

14

email

lb

on the

16

can be court

17

minor

children

18

she's

not

19

future

what

she

ordered

appointed

23

saying

24

order

this

cooperate

"The

issue

"The

W h e r e do we get

that

to give consent
Since

children
from7

Tlorence,

Let me tell

that a parent

I lorence

-- mother

or

to have a passport
have

about

travel and

they can

Tlorence

sent her back one and

whatever

I want

If you want

I've

research
lather
made

--

foi

to

avoid

when
>aid, "Iley,

been chosen

to challenge

an

changed,

She's only trying

where

"You

you

considerable

circumstances

to

he's

these

t h a t , "After

excuse

not going

- - because

She sent Mr

credit

rirrurnstances

so I'm

tells Brian

to do
did

so to her

to be recalcitrant

right

Instead
that,

indicating

She

to run off with

your Honor

this age "

trying

T can

What'

it is doubtful

So Brian

22

said,

same day

conflicts

look,

said,

You can't make me do it "

topic,

21

and

in any event, then she

12

20

"

trying

she had e>cuse aftei

anymore b e c a u s e

he's p r o b a b l / going

But

were missing,

that

her mind

has been

would

to cooperate

has become u n e m p l o y e d ,

passports

and nov/er retuin

thot

Then after

Paul

the parties

My client

first she was going

she changed

to get

11

it that

some of the documents

Then
have changed

25

At

a passport

up once

7

10

Tlorence ordered

the

and
order

on the passport, do it in court."
she emails him back

and she says that she

of overriding p a r e n t a l

consent

felt

falls o u t s i d e

the
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realm of the special master, and asks you to defer the issue of

2

overriding the parental consent to a legislative body, now that

3

you better understand my ob'jections ."

4

acknowledge that she had complied with his original request

5

cooperate on the passports, and he sent her back a note and said,

6

"Look, if you feci I've exceeded my authority, you need to appeal

7

the issue to the Court."

8
9

She requested that he
to

So she's not complying, and this is just one example
of Brian Florence.

Your Honor, if Brian Florence's orders are

10

not -- if she's not compelled to obey his orders or to comply

11

with the correct procedure for challenging them in this court,

12

which she has not. done, then we're lost because we're going to

13

be in here -- and this is your incentive, your Honor.

14

in here every week on some new issue, because each one of these

15

five or six emails I get from her everyday is a complaint, a

16

challenge, a threat of this, of that, and Brian Florence gets

17

just as many.

18

So we need to uphold him.

We'll be

He was appointed to do these

19

issues on children, and she goes around him and won't do it every

20

single time she doesn't like how he rules.

21

So your Honor, we are asking for -- that she be held

22

in contempt of court and jail time for not complying with Brian

23

Florence's recommendations that she cooperate on the passport, or

24

short of that, that she will show up on a date and time certain

25

and that she show up and cooperate or she goes to jail, because
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otherwise it's never going to happen because she keeps corning up

2

with

<:•>. x c u s e

3

a i tier e x c u s e .

Again, your Honor, we want contempt for the 11,000 she

4

hasn't paid, and we also want attorney's fees and costs for this

5

counter motion compelling her to comply with the decree and Brian

6

l-Morence's special master order.

7

THE COURT:

8

MS. TAYLOR:

9

THE COURT:

10
11

Okay.

Thank you.

Ms. Taylor?

Are we hearing the counter motions?
We're hearing anything you want to argue

today.
MS. SCHMID:

Oh, your Honor, I can address this

12

objection to the counter motion.

13

addressed that.

14

the criteria of Rule 101(g) so it: should be not heard today.

15

1 just forgot I hadn't

She claims our counter motion doesn't meet

Once again, she doesn't understand the rule.

What it

16

says is, "Opposing a motion is not enough to get affirmative

17

relief," but that's precisely why I filed an opposition and a

18

counter motion.

19

combined in one document.

20

There's nothing that prohibits it from being

The fact that it has nothing to do with the motion to

21

show cause, which in any event it does because we're asking for

22

attorney's fees incurred opposing her bad faith motion, doesn't

23

bar it as a counter motion.

24

THE COURT:

25

MS. TAYLOR:

Okay.

Ms. Taylor?

There's just so many outrageous statements
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that have been made that are so untrue, I never said half ot

2

the things she said

3

counter motjon, I'm just g o m q

4

and gut a record of what she has actually said.

5

I just -- if we're going forward with the
to have to ask for a continuance

J think she's completely misrepresented that J send hei

6

tive to six emails a day.

7

that.

8

qranted it has been on occasion -- not every single day -- on

9

occasion, one occasion I've sent her six emails in a day to try

10

I physically don't have time to do

When I do try to catch up and communicate with her,

to co tch up.
I don't even know where to start as fai rir^ addressing

11
12

the other

issues.

The Brian Florence thing is completely

13

exaggerated, absolutely not what happened.

14

THE COURT:

15

MS. TAYLOR:

16
17
18

Do the kids have passports?
They do not.

Do you want me to go throuqh

lhe story ?
THE COURT:

He said that you had to cooperate in getting

them passports, correct?

19

MS. TAYLOR:

20

THE COURT:

And they don't have passports.

21

MS. TAYLOR:

-- initially met with him --

22

THE COURT:

23

Okay.

When we --

I asked a question.

I expect an answer.

ordered partic -- cooperation to get the passports, correct?

24

MS. TAYLOR:

25

THE COURT:

He did, and I cooperated.
Have you signed off on both passports?

He

•191
2

MS
correct

TAYIOR

When we showed

TI1C C O U R T

4

MS

So the answer

TAYLOR

Mr

contacted

Florence and ^aid,

6

w<^ o u g i n n l l y

met,

7

wasn't

to be oppositional

8

a * my a g r e e i n g

9

pa i ties riqree

trying

t o that

I cooperated

5

not

have

the

I think

1 never

as ordered

"I

think

I was really
about

to get a passport
agreed

is no

"

I subsequently

you mistook

trying

to get

anything

He stated

to get

when
ilonq

You

took

that

in his order

a passport

ior

I

the

t lie

children

11

Once

1?

I the email

13

passport,

14

order

15

know

16

because

17

negative

18

and

19

traveling

20

that

21

court

that

I pointed

wasn't
and

I did

discussed

I said

no

cooperate

I have opposed

we have

that out, and

I said,
with

"

you

outbide

passports

that

he made

24

orders.

with

no o t h e r p r o v i s i o n s
I did

apply

THE COURT-

that

that
I had

to a

original

"Now

for the

that

they've

had

very

age of 7

they should

their dad,"

not

T said,

to make an

be
"Now

additional

that."

I was not agreeing
-- no additional

though,

to it,

court

-- I did -Nathan has a p a s s p o r t ,

you

children,

their young

shows

then you can do

lie -- once he understood

23

that

the country

I comply,

him,

o u t s i d e , because

know rny stand on that, if vou want

order

with your

1 asked

e x p e r i e n c e s , and b e c a u s e of

alone

she -- a lot of

if 1 was agreeing

"I agreed

Paul

getting

no relatives

travel

he said

lie asked

9, and a lot of other evidence

22

25

did

documents

3

10

up Paul

iiqhf
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MS. TAYLOR:

2

THE COURT:

3

MS. TAYLOR:

4

Did Paul sign the passpoit?
Jt was probably obtained about three years

ciy o .

5

THE COURT:

6

MS. TAYLOR:

7

THE COURT:

8

MS. TAYLOR:

9

Yes, he does.

And his father signed the application?
Yes, he did.
Okay.

Go ahead.

So I just think the whole Brian Florence

and I'm trying to be recalcitrant, there's so many misstatements.

10

Since T have told -- since I have cleared up the notion that I'm

11

agreeing to the kids traveling outside of the United States,

12

there has been no additional orders from Brian Florence on that.

13

I stand by -- 1 did - - even though I didn't want to, 1

14

did show up that day.

15

off.

16

was very dismissive that he didn't have the right documents, so

17

we're going to come back.

18

up things with Mr. Florence.

19

I canceled my patients.

I took a halt day

J traveled to the Farmington courthouse from Tooele.

That gave me the opportunity to clear

As far as going back to the child support, there was

20

an issue that never addressed if she agreed that there's an

21

outstanding balance of $1218 or not.

22

arrears from May, June and July, and I don't see how she can

23

accuse me of bringing this motion unnecessarily.

24
25

Paul

If there is, it's an

With respect to the emergency motion for a restraining
order, it was Ms. Schrnid that actually told me in a very hostile
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email thar if I called her of face she was going to hang up on mo,

2

ohcj was going to get a restraining order against me

3

just- want to have rules.

4

other by phone.

5

All -

1

I don't think we should Lonhjri each

By phone, I think that's by fax, too.

I'm nor sure why she's saying 1 haven't provided n

6

phy-sjc^l address

7

you a s V i ntj a physical address where someone actually signs tor

o

comrrhmq7"

9
10

TIIC COURT:

I want a physical address

I said, "Are

I w.inl it right

now wherp she can serve papers on you.

11

MS

12

THi: COURT-

13

MS

14

I cleared that up wath hei

TAYLOR

And I provided that to her

It's 3?9 West

So 829 West.

TAYLOR

Somerset Drive, S-o-m-e-r-s-e-t

It's in

North SaJt Lake, 34054.

15

TIIC COURT-

16

MS. TAYLOR:

17

TIIC COURT:

13

MS. TAYLOR:

Okay.

Is that your residence 7

Yes, it is.
Okay

I have never contested that she hand

19

deliver documents to that residence.

20

haven't got documents.

21

she said, "I told the messenger to deliver to whoever was at the

22

door," I simply requested please don't deliver them to my

23

children.

24
25

I have never said that T

All 1 did when she sent me the thing and

My phone call to her that day was actually, "Hey, you
asked me for an address and I haven't received anything.

Was

-221

anything sent?"

2

machine when she has instructed her staff to hang up on me if

3

I call i .s a little reaching.

4

I think for her to say she now needs a fax

1 don't even know how to explain all the other

5

ex agger at; ions that I think she's made.

6

addressing her counter motion, the agenda items on that.

/

think it should have been a counter motion.

8

should be heard today.

9

THE COURT:

10
11

MS. TAYLOR:
it.

12
13

I don't

I don't think it

Why not?
I don't think there should be a ruling on

1 didn't have proper time -THE COURT:

Tell me why.

What's your legal reason that

we shouldn't hear the counter motion today?

14
1J

I don't know if we're

MS. TAYLOR:

Rule 101(g) that says a counter motion has

to be responsive to the motion that 1 filed.

16

THE COURT:

That's the only argument that you have on

18

MS. TAYLOR:

I.don't have any case law, your Honor.

19

THE COURT:

20

MS. TAYLOR:

17

that?

Okay.

Anything else?

Oh, yes.

Okay.

With respect to the -- her

21

request for attorney's fees, I really don't know what happened.

22

We entered into a settlement agreement on April 15,h.

23

signed that; we had some discrepancies about the account.

24

we were headed for trouble.

25

After we
We knew

You instructed her by minute entry to change paragraph

-231

17 and

2

August 25"' --

3

amended

4

aberration of our settlement agreement.

5

g e t ting a copy of.

18, and what came back to your courtroom that was :nqned
or excuse rnc, August 24 ,h , if you look at the

judgment that you signed on August 24 th was a complete

6

That's what I ended up

I filed a relief from the amended judgment of August

7

24 Ul .

8

many of the paragraphs had been changed.

9

completely outrageous.

In it it had me paying child support to the petitioner,
I mean it was just

I think for her to now say that I'm the

10

one that's being so confusing, I'm not sure why that was signed

11

August: 21 th , and then a sep -- and again, another amended judgment

12

was signed on September

10rh.

13

.She's argued that the judgment requires me -- that:

14

requires that Paul is allowed to decrease his child support

15

amount.

16

agreement or in court.

17

of court.

18

discussed Paul retiring right after our settlement agreement, he

19

represented to the Court that nothing was going to change.

20

was still going to carry insurance.

21

That was never discussed, either in our settlement.
She added that, she said, to keep us out

Well, obviously it hasn't because when we originally

The insurance was $48 a month.

He

Since then it's gone

22

to $120 a month.

I'm not saying that's a gross difference.

23

I'm just saying it was never in the settlement agreement that he

24

decrease the amount that he was paying in child support, or it

25

wasn't made in the minute entry that he could take his child

-24support

amount

confusing

of S352 and

about what

just decease

amount

it.

he was actually

It was
going

just

very

to claim

for

med.i ca 1 e x p e n s e s .
THE C O U R T :
premium
and

for health

half

child

State

insurance

support.

that

Okay.

Thank

Recovery

Okay.

they submitted

They -- beginning

THE C O U R T :

THE C O U R T :

All

I indicated

I just

respond

the Office of R e c o v e r y

your

to carry

to one

Services?

to the Office

submit our e x p e n s e s .

of

insurance on

the

Those -- so the

now.

you.

right.

All

--

Your Honor, could
this physical

I just
address

to her that I would

-- you know, with
known a d d r e s s

to prove

In -- could

1 st , according

Thank

My problem with

Her response
any way

just part of

Okay.

M S . SCI1MID:

was the last

support,

Okay.

M S . TAYLOR:

because

child

you.

You do that through ORS

M S . TAYLOR:

me is that

from

the

--

THE C O U R T :

things.

the cost of

Those are

both allowed

and we can both

that he has

costs.

from

February

S e r v i c e s , we're

children,
payment

to be deducted

of the out of pocket

M S . TAYLOR:
thing

law allows half of

back

a messenger, and

-- just

two

that she's

be sending

it

given
there

that was because

she had left with

that

the C o u r t .

to me was that, " W e l l ,

I wouldn't

that she actually got the d o c u m e n t s . "

So

have

that's

•2 5 -

1

going to bo - -

2

MS. TAYLOR:

That's not what 1 said.

3

MS. SCMMID:

That's going to be --

4

MS. TAYLOR:

Could you read exactly the --

5

THR COURT:

6

MS. SCMMID:

7

That's going to be another huge bone of

contention when I leave documents there.

8
9

Shh.

THE COURT:

No, it won't because you're going to send

them --

10

MS. SCMMID:

11

THE COURT:

Because there's no mailbox.
You're going to mail them, and the Utah

12

Rules of Civil Procedure are going to control.

13

when ma i1ed .

14

MS. SCMMID:

15

mailing, your Honor.

16

THE COURT:

17

MS. SCMMID:

18

21

But then I've got to add three days for

Yeah, you do.
Which is an onerous burden on us because

we've got to add three days then onto everything.

19
20

They are served

THE COURT:

It's the way you do every case you've got,

isn't it?
MS. SCHMID:

It's not true, your Honor.

Every case I

22

have, at: least I have a courteous opposing Counsel that will

23

allow me to hand deliver documents at their offices.

24
25

THE COURT:

Well, I understand what you're saying about

that, but that's how we're going to have to do service from now

-261

on.

We're not. going to do it by fax.

2

respondent's motions are denied.

3

communications in connection with the esse

4

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the respondent will be

5

served by mail at the address that she read into the record,

6

which is her residence address.

7

to give people notice that it changes.

8
9

Okay.

All of the

As I just said, all
will be pursuant

to

If that changes, it's her burden

The petitioner's counter motion is granted with
respect to the passport.

You have to get a passport for Rachel.

1 0 I Passports have to be available to both parents for travel outside
11

the country with the children.

12

done, Ms. Taylor.

13

You have five days to get that

Ms . Taylor is in contempt for failing to pay the $1.1,000

14

when due.

15

Tooele County Jail, plus $1,000 fine.

16

purge the contempt by getting the passports done within five days

1/

and paying the $41,000 within 24 hours.

18

and costs to Mr. Taylor.

19

For her contempt I'm sentencing her to 30 days in the
I'm going to allow her to

I'm also awarding fees

The reason for the fees and costs, in addition to the

20

fact that Ms. Taylor is in violation of court orders, is that you

21

intentionally engage in a course of conduct to make dealings with

22

you all but impossible.

23

time that's been in court.

24

Counsel, representing yourself and putting the other party in a

25

position where he has to pay legal fees for emails and telephone

I have observed this personally over the
That includes constantly changing

-27ca.l. Is and other matters which are an entire waste of time;.
Mo more telephone calls to -- between you and
Ms. Schmicl.
mail.

No emails.

No faxes.

Everything goes through the

J will expect to hear from Ms. Schmid whether or not the

$4 1,000 is paid in the next 24 hours, and the passport for Rachel
is set up within the next five days.

If I hear that that hadn't

happened, T * .13. be issuing a bench warrant for your arrest.

Do

you understand, Ms. Taylor?
MS. TAYLOR:
me to get -- as

Could 1 just clarify?

You're ordering

the Court -- or officer of the Court to get a

p a s s p o r t for Rachel?
THE COURT:
MS. TAYLOR:
THE COURT:
MS. TAYLOR:
THE COURT:
MS. TAYLOR:

Yes.
Even if I am not giving rny consent?
Absolutely.
Okay.
It comes up all the time in divorce cases.
And even though Paul is in arrears on child

support he is not in contempt?
THE COURT:

I thought you said you weren't making any

motion about child support and that ORS was taking care of all
of it.

You withdrew that.
MS. SCHMID:
THE COURT:

Isn't that what you said?

That's what she said, your Honor.
I mean does he owe anything to ORS above and

beyond the continuing ongoing support?
MS. SCI1MID:

No, your Honor.

MS. TAYLOR:

There's --

MS. SCHMID:

As of today he owes zero.

She said jn

court tori ay that apparently there was some rniscornmu ni ca t ion with
ORS, and there's some additional monies owed.

If there is, my

client is unaware of that, and there is no proof here about that,
other, than her representation to the Court.
TIIK COURT:
at this point.

Okay.

ORS is in charge of child support

If ORS comes to me with a motion asking for

contempt, I'll deal with it when it comes.
MS. SCHMID:

And the attorney's fees and costs, your

Honor, I will establish by affidavit?
THE COURT:
MS. SCHMID:

Yes, standard procedure.
Yes, your Honor, and I'll draw up the-

order .
THE COURT:
MS. SCHMID:

Okay.

Thank you.

Thank you.

(Hearing concluded)
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on February 8, 2010)

3

THE COURT:

4

MS. SCHMID:

Taylor vs. Taylor.
Your Honor, Gayanne Schmid on behalf of

5

the petitioner, Paul Taylor, who is present.

6

Ms. Taylor.

7

THE COURT:

We haven't, either.

We've not seen

Let me ask you just to

8

step out into the hall and take a quick glance around to see if

9

s he's standing there.

10
11

MS. SCHMID:

Do you want us to give her a

call?

12

TIIE COURT:

13

MS. SCHMID:

14

I'll do so.

On the phone?
All right.

Oh, that would be fine, too.
We'll step out and do that,

you r: Honor .

15

THE COURT:

Okay.

16

(Short recess taken)

17

THE COURT:

Okay.

Ms. Taylor, let me cut through what

18

we've had here.

I understand that you didn't get the $41,000

19

paid according to the time frame in which I ordered that it be

20

I paid, and No. 2, that you may have signed the application for

21

passport, but you undid the signing by writing "under duress"

22

next to your signature.

23
24
25

MS. TAYLOR:

Are either of those things true?

I'd like to state an objection to this

notice before we start.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MS. TAYLOR:
Till-; COURT:
the record.

Just for the record.
Okay.

You've stated an objection.

It's on

Now answer my questions.

MS. TAYLOR:

The $41,000 I had ready within 24 hours.

I did not know that the petitioner would not pick the check up.
I just didn't think that was going to be a problem.

As soon as

wo found out that he would not pick it up, .1 drove over to my
accountant's office and drove to his home to drop it off.

lie

w,.i s n ' r. t h e re .
I waited
The
at

fax

from

9 o'clock

about

a n h o u r- a n d- a-h a 1 f ,

M s . Schrnid t o m y a c c o u n t a n t
in t h e m o r n i n g .

drove

back

home.

w a s it h a d t o b e

I h a d to w o r k

there

at 8, a n d h e r o f f i c e

(inaudible) opened at 8, so I waited until 8 o'clock with the
check, ran upstairs, dropped it on her desk and rushed to work.
I did not realize there was a problem.

This was noticed up as

a -- this matter, and I didn't know there was a problem until
right now, your Honor.
THE COURT:
MS. TAYLOR:

Okay.

Tell me about the passport.

With respect to the passport, as far as-

federal law goes only one parent needs to give consent

if there's

a court order in place, and all that needs to be attached

is a

document stating that there is a court order in place.
Till-: COURT:

Did you sign the passport and write "under

duress" when you signed it?
MS. TAYLOR:

Yes, I did.

-41
2

THE COURT:

I find you in contempt of court.

You've got 30 days in jail and a $1,0 00 fine.

3
4

Okay.

MS. TAYLOR:
scheduled

Yes, sir.

That's forthwith.

Your Honor, 1 have two patients

for tomorrow at 1 a.m.

5

THE COURT:

That's too bad.

6

MS. TAYLOR:

May 1 just -- all I'm asking for is 10

7

minutes on the phone with my office to get those rescheduled to

8

a different office.

9

THE COURT:

No.

10

MS. TAYLOR:

Okay.

11

MS. SCI1MID:

Thank you, your Honor.

12

MS. TAYLOR:

I just have to give --

13

COURT BAILIFF:

14

MS. TAYLOR:

15

18
19

This way back here.

I'm sorry.

Here's my pleadings for

Ms. Schmid.

16
17

Thank you.

THE COURT:

Does that go to Ms. Schrnid or to me?

I hav^'

no idea.
COURT BAILIFF:

She said they were pleadings.

Should I

just put them in her property in an envelope?

20

THE COURT:

21

MS. SCHMID:

22

THE COURT:

23

MS. SCHMID:

Uh-huh.
Your Honor?
Yeah.
My client has -- my client is not allowed

24

to go to her home.

Only the children are there, and she was

25

supposed to go back to get the kids, so under -- does he have a

-51

right

to q o to the house

2

TI1R C O U R T :

3

MS.

4

either

5

p e r in i s s i o n .

party

6
7

t h e ki ds

9

THE C O U R T :
MS.

11

THE C O U R T :

13

to the

SCHMID:

If it's not

prior

similar

14

MS.

SCHMID:

15

THE C O U R T :

16

MS.
your

SCHMID:

in the

order

against

home without

I think we need a third

person

decree

written

to pick

up

Okay.

We'll arrange

for

that.

Okay.
Thank

you, your

Honor.

M s . Schmid, would
too much

you do findings on

trouble, pen

some

kind of

the
history

problems.
I'd

be happy

Thank

to do so, your

Honor.

you.

Your Honor, you do realize

she's

appealed

decision?

18

THE C O U R T :

19

MS. SCHMID:

20

THE C O U R T :

21

it's a restraining

to the other party's

SCHMID:

10

hearing?

an order

then.
MS.

12

-- is it just

Yeah,

THE C O U R T :

8

17

What's

SCHMID:
corning

to get the chi1d ren ?

O h , no, not aware of
It's on a p p e a l .
Fine.

Sorry about

incur.

22

MS.

23

(Hearing

SCHMID:

that.

Thank

concluded)

you.

the attorney

fees

you'll
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PAUL MCKINNEY TAYLOR,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Petitioner,
Civil No.: 054300395 DA
vs.
TRISHA RICHARD TAYLOR,

Judge: Henriod
Commissioner: Tack

Respondent.

This matter came on for review on February 8, 2010, before the Court, the Honorable
Stephen Henriod presiding. The Court having heard proffers of testimony, reviewed the files
and records in this case and being fully advised in the premises, hereby makes and enters its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On January 25, 2010, Respondent's Motions for Relief from Amended Judgment

of September 3, 2009, and to Show Cause re: Child Support and her "Emergency Request for

Restraining Order" and Petitioner's Countermotions for Relief and Awards of Attorney's Fees
and Costs came on regularly before this Court, the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod presiding.
2.

The Court denied all of Respondent's Motions.

3.

The Court granted Petitioner's Countermotion. With respect to the minor

child Rachel's passport, the parties were ordered to obtain one for her and the passports were to
be available for both parents for travel outside the country with the children. The Court ordered
Respondent to get this accomplished within five days.
4.

Respondent had been ordered to get a passport for Rachel by the court-appointed

Special Master, Brian Florence, on or about May 11, 2009. Thereafter, Respondent objected to
the Special Master Report and Order filed with the Court and requested that it be vacated.
Respondent's motion was denied.
5.

The Court found Respondent in contempt of Court for failing to pay the $41,000

to Petitioner, when due, or by January 1, 2010. Respondent signed a Stipulation and Settlement
Agreement on April 15, 2010, in which she agreed to pay this sum to Petitioner and an Amended
Judgment ordering her to pay Petitioner the sum of $41,000 was entered on September 3,2009.
By way of explanation, Respondent alleged that she was in the process of selling her business
and had asked Petitioner's counsel to review a release of all claims, but did not dispute
Petitioner's allegations that she had not provided any proof that the business was being sold,
when it was closing, or even a copy of the release.
6.

For her contempt, Respondent was sentenced to 30 days in the Tooele County

Jail, and ordered to pay a $1,000 fine. The Court allowed Respondent to purge her contempt by
getting the passport done within five days and by paying the $41,000 within 24 hours. The Court

2

ruled that if these things did not occur as ordered, a bench warrant would issue for Respondent's
arrest.
7.

Respondent was also ordered to pay Petitioner's attorney's fees and costs. The

Court specifically found that the award was based on Respondent's violation of court orders and
the fact that she intentionally engaged in a course of conduct to make dealings with her all but
impossible. The Court noted that it had observed this personally, over time, and that it included
constantly changing counsel, representing herself, and putting Petitioner in a position where he
had to pay legal fees for emails and telephone calls between Respondent and Petitioner's counsel,
which the Court found to be an entire waste of time. This prior conduct included having to
threaten Respondent with incarceration at a contempt hearing on October 20, 2008, if
Respondent did not sign the standard form contract required by the court-appointed custody
evaluator, Dr,. Valerie Hale.
8.

Respondent did not pay the $41,000 to Petitioner within 24 hours as ordered.

Respondent stated that she had the check ready within 24 hours at her accountant's office but did
not know the Petitioner would not pick it up. Petitioner had provided a letter from Respondent's
accountant indicating that he had been instructed not to release the check to Petitioner until he
had signed a release. Petitioner's counsel advised Respondent's accountant that picking up the
check at his office and signing a release were not Court-ordered preconditions and that
Respondent was in contempt of Court. Respondent claimed she drove the check over to
Petitioner's home to deliver it but he was not home. Respondent admittedly hand-delivered the
check for $41,000 to the office of Petitioner's counsel at approximately 8:00 a.m on January 27,
2010.
3

9.

Respondent met Petitioner to get the child's passport accomplished but admittedly

wrote "signed under duress" under her signature on the passport application. By way of
explanation, Respondent stated that under federal law only one parent needs to give consent for a
passport if that parent attaches a document stating that there is a court order in place.
10.

The Court finds Respondent in contempt of Court, to serve 30 days in jail and pay

a $1,000 fine.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court concludes that Respondent is in contempt.

2.

Respondent shall serve 30 days in the Tooele County Jail and pay a $1,000 fine,

forthwith.
Dated: February

,2010

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Approved as to Form and Content

Bart Johnsen
Attorney for Respondent

4

NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 7(f)(2), you have five days after service
of the foregoing on you to file your Notice of Objection. If no Notice is filed withinfivedays,
the foregoing order will be presented to the Court for signature.

DATED: February 19,2010

SCHMID & LUHN, P
/ By: GaVanhe 1}C. Schmid
\ Attorneys for Petitioner

PROOF OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage pre-paid
on this February 19, 2010, on the following:
Bart J. Johnsen
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
P.O. Box 45345
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1478
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Gayanne K. Schmid (State Bar No. 6793)
SCHMID & LUHN, P.C.
331 S. Rio Grande, Suite 201
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1436
Telephone: (801) 531-8300
Facsimile: (801) 363-2420
Attorneys for Petitioner

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PAUL MCKINNEY TAYLOR,

ORDER FOLLOWING HEARING
ON FEBRUARY 8, 2010

Petitioner,
Civil No.: 054300395 DA
vs.
TRISHA RICHARD TAYLOR,

Judge: Henriod
Commissioner: Tack

Respondent.

This matter came on for review on February 8,2010, before the Court, the Honorable
Stephen Henriod presiding. The Court having heard proffers of testimony, reviewed the files
and records in this case, made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and
being fully advised in the premises,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1.

Respondent is in contempt of Court.

2.

Respondent shall serve 30 days in the Tooele County Jail and pay a $1,000 fine,

forthwith.
Dated: February

,2010

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Approved as to Form and Content

Bart Johnsen
Attorney for Respondent

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 7(f)(2), you have five days after service
of the foregoing on you to file your Notice of Objection. If no Notice is filed within five days,
the foregoing order will be presented to the Court for signature.
DATED: February 19,2010

SCHMID & LI

2

PROOF OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage pre-paid
on this February 19, 2010, on the following counsel of record:

Bart J. Johnsen
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
P.O. Box 45345
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1478

/ GayarAie R. Schmid

3

